Activist Directors: Determinants and Consequences by Gow, Ian D et al.
 
Activist Directors: Determinants and Consequences
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Gow, Ian D., Sa-Pyung Sean Shin, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Activist
Directors: Determinants and Consequences." Harvard Business
School Working Paper, No. 14-120, June 2014.
Accessed February 17, 2015 7:08:34 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13479133
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP 
Copyright © 2014 by Ian D. Gow, Sa-Pyung Sean Shin, and Suraj Srinivasan 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and 
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working 
papers are available from the author. 
 
 
Activist Directors: 
Determinants and 
Consequences  
 
Ian D. Gow 
Sa-Pyung Sean Shin 
Suraj Srinivasan 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
14-120 
 
June 26, 2014 
 Activist directors:
Determinants and consequences
Preliminary draft: Please do not quote or cite without permission
Ian D. Gow1 Sa-Pyung Sean Shin1 Suraj Srinivasan1
May 30, 2014
1All authors are at Harvard Business School. We thank the Division of Research at Harvard Business
School for ﬁnancial support and participants in the HBS Accounting and Management brown bag sem-
inar for helpful suggestions. Stephanie Kreutz and Kristen Garner provided excellent research supportAbstract
This paper examines the determinants and consequences of hedge fund activism with a fo-
cus on activist directors, i.e., those directors appointed in response to demands by activists.
Using a sample of 1,969 activism events over the period 2004–2012, we identify 824 activist
directors. We ﬁnd that activists are more likely to gain board seats at smaller ﬁrms and those
with weaker stock price performance. Activists remain as shareholders longer when they have
board seats, with holding periods consistent with conventional notions of “long-term” institu-
tional investors. As in prior research, we ﬁnd positive announcement-period returns of around
4–5% when a ﬁrm is targeted by activists, and a 2% increase in return on assets over the subse-
quent one to ﬁve years. We ﬁnd that activist directors are associated with signiﬁcant strategic
and operational actions by ﬁrms. We ﬁnd evidence of increased divestiture, decreased acquisi-
tion activity, higher probability of being acquired, lower cash balances, higher payout, greater
leverage, higher CEO turnover, lower CEO compensation, and reduced investment. With the
exception of the probability of being acquired, these estimated effects are generally greater
when activists obtain board representation, consistent with board representation being an im-
portant mechanism for bringing about the kinds of changes that activists often demand.1. Introduction
Hedge fund activism has become a signiﬁcant phenomenon in recent years. This kind of ac-
tivism differs from more traditional forms of shareholder activism, such as shareholder pro-
posals ﬁled under SEC Rule 14a-8, both in the nature of the activists, as well as in the scale
and type of intervention. More traditional activism has often been initiated by pension funds
and individual activists (sometimes called “gadﬂies”) with relatively weaker incentives to gen-
erate higher returns by inﬂuencing the management of a ﬁrm. In contrast, as pointed out by
Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), hedge funds have stronger incentives to produce higher returns,
fewer conﬂicts of interest, and “much more ﬂexibility to intervene in the invested companies.”
Brav et al. (2010, 187). These differences appear to have led to hedge fund activists making a
broader range of demands and adopting a wider range of tactics to have those demands met
than traditional shareholder activists.
One approach used by hedge fund activists to inﬂuence companies in which they have in-
vested, is to seek to join the board of directors of these companies. But this is not costless.
First, there are direct costs associated with getting on the board, which Gantchev (2013) ﬁnds
to be signiﬁcant. Second, by joining the board the activists (or their nominees) stake their rep-
utations by taking on a role in implementing their demands. Third, board positions also come
with ﬁduciary responsibilities towards all shareholders. Given the additional cost and commit-
ment required of activists that get board representation—and the tendency for such investors to
take “long-term” positions when they do so—studying the actions of ﬁrms with such directors
can provide new insight into the motives and effects of hedge fund activists.
Hedge fund activism is not without its critics. Some have argued that hedge fund activism is
potentially harmful due to the possibility that the activist interests are “not necessarily aligned
with the interests of long-term investors” (Strine Jr 2014). Given the potentially greater inﬂu-
ence that activists have when they get in the boardroom, by focusing on such cases, our paper
aims to deepen our understanding of the effects of hedge fund activism.
1Our paper addresses a number of questions related to activist directors. First, we focus on
the circumstances surrounding the appointment of activist directors to the board. When do
activists seek board representation? And when are they successful in obtaining it? How do
activist directors differ from other directors? Second, what impact do activists have when they
get on the board? Does their impact differ from that of other cases of activism? Finally, is there
evidence of short-termism?
Our sample of 1,969 activism events comprises all activism events targeted at US companies
from 2004 to 2012.1 In each case, we code whether the activist made demands for board repre-
sentation and whether the activist obtained seats on the board. We identify 824 directors who
were appointed to the board in response to activist demands. With regard to the ﬁrst set of
questions, we ﬁnd, consistent with prior research, that activists tend to target ﬁrms with more
institutional shareholders, smaller market capitalization, and worse recent stock performance.
Additionally, conditional on being targeted by activists, we ﬁnd that activists are more likely
to demand board representation when the ﬁrm has less leverage and is smaller. With regard
to performance, we ﬁnd evidence that board representation is demanded at ﬁrms with worse
stock market performance, but higher operating performance (return on assets); this is consis-
tent with board representation being sought for objectives other than reversing poor operating
performance. Butwealsoﬁndthatﬁrmswitholderdirectors, withdirectorswithlongertenure,
and with staggered boards are more likely to be targeted. Conditional on a ﬁrm being targeted
for activism, we ﬁnd little that explains when activists get board seats.
We describe the characteristics of activist directors and compare them with new directors ap-
pointed at other ﬁrms.2 We ﬁnd that activist director characteristics differ according to whether
the director is afﬁliated with activists or not. Activist-afﬁliated directors (i.e., employees or
principals of members of the activist group) are about 9 years younger than other new direc-
tors and much less frequently female. Activist directors are appointed to key committees just
1We additionally require that the target ﬁrm is matched to CRSP, is not an investment trust or mutual fund,
and that the event is not a control contests involving another corporation.
2In prior research, we show that activism is often associated with departure of incumbent directors (Gow,
Srinivasan and Shin 2014).
2as often as other new directors, suggesting that they quickly move into key board positions.
About 42 percent (346 of 824) of activist directors are directly employed at the hedge fund ac-
tivist; the rest (478) appear to be unafﬁliated directly to the hedge fund despite being sponsored
by the activist for the board position.
Using methods that account for censoring, we ﬁnd that activists hold stock in a target ﬁrm for
a median of about 2.4 years when their demands do not include board representation, and that
this increases to 3 years in cases where the activists obtain board representation. A three-year
holding period implies that these activists can be considered as “long-term” investors.3
We then examine a number of possible consequences of activist directors for the ﬁrms whose
boards they join. Consistent with prior research, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant risk-adjusted returns
around the announcement of activism, with returns from  20 to +20 trading days around
the announcement ranging from 3.9% to 4.9%. We ﬁnd no evidence of a market reaction at the
appointment of activist directors, perhaps reﬂecting the difﬁculty of identifying precisely when
the market learns about activist board appointments. Looking beyond positive announcement-
period returns, operating performance seems to improve, with return on assets increasing
by more than 2% over the ﬁve years after activism. In terms of underlying actions, we ﬁnd
evidence of increased divestiture, decreased acquisition activity, higher probability of being
acquired, lower cash balances, higher payout, greater leverage, higher CEO turnover, lower
CEO compensation, and lower capital expenditure, research and development, and advertis-
ing. With the exception of the probability of being acquired, the estimated effects are generally
greater when activists obtain board representation (though not always statistically so), consis-
tent with board representation being an important mechanism for bringing about the kinds of
changes that activists often demand.
The primary goal of our paper is to contribute to the understanding of the increasingly impor-
tant phenomenon of hedge fund activism. Overall, we ﬁnd that activist directors are associated
with signiﬁcant strategic and operational actions by ﬁrms. While the observational data avail-
3As discussed in Section 5, pension funds have a typical duration of 2 years and investor relation professionals
consider a horizon of more than 2.8 years to warrant the label “long-term.”
3able to us do not permit unequivocal causal inferences, the associations we document appear
consistent with hedge fund activists having an impact, especially when they obtain board rep-
resentation. The breadth and depth of these apparent effects suggests that, when activists get
board representation, their impact is not simply about the “ability of activists to force target
ﬁrms into a takeover” (Greenwood and Schor 2009, 362). However, even if given a causal in-
terpretation, it is unclear whether all of these effects are beneﬁcial to shareholders. For instance,
while our evidence is consistent with activist directors playing a signiﬁcant role in curbing ex-
penditures on capital, research and development (R&D), and advertising, it is unclear whether
this reﬂects curtailment of excessive investments or, as critics of activists might suggest, under-
investment with a focus on the short term. However, the relatively long-term holding period
in cases where activists become directors, positive stock market effect, and long-term operating
performance improvements seem inconsistent with activist directors being short-termist.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes features of shareholder activism
campaigns and related literature. Section 3 describes our data and descriptive statistics. Section
4 examines the circumstances in which activists seek and obtain board representation. Section
5 examines the association with activist board representation and activist holding periods. Sec-
tion 6 examines stock returns for activism targets with and without board-related demands and
for ﬁrm where activists get board representation. Section 7 examines the association between
activist directors and ﬁrm outcomes, such as operating performance, investment behavior and
CEO incentives. Section 8 concludes.
2. Institutional background and prior literature
In this section we discuss institutional details and related research. We ﬁrst provide some il-
lustrative examples of activist engagements with companies to provide a ﬂavor of the wide
variety of tactics and strategies employed by activists, the types of demands made, and out-
comes that are associated with activism. These examples show how seeking directorships in
target ﬁrms is an important element of the activist approach.
42.1. Illustrative cases
In some cases, activists make pointed demands that yield swift reaction from the target ﬁrms.
For example, on June 6, 2012, Becker Drapkin Management LP ﬁled a 13D reporting a 5% stake
in Tuesday Morning Corporation. In a letter to the board, Becker Drapkin complained that
the company’s performance had suffered since Kathleen Mason became CEO in 2000, and that
shareholder representation on the board was necessary to instill accountability. Later that same
day, the company announced the departure of Kathleen Mason as president and CEO and that
it had commenced a search for a new CEO. On June 26, 2012, Becker Drapkin disclosed that
it was engaged in discussions with the company regarding board representation. On July 2,
2012, the company announced the appointment of two representatives of Becker Drapkin to the
board, that it would work with Becker Drapkin to add two additional independent directors,
and Becker Drapkin agreed to standstill provisions lasting two years.4
In other cases, board demands emerge only after continued poor performance and resistance to
the activist’s demands. For example, on June 28, 2007, Barington Capital Group L.P. sent a letter
to the Chairman and CEO of Dillard’s Inc. requesting a meeting to discuss measures to achieve
better ﬁnancial performance and operational efﬁciency. After this request was declined, on
August 30, 2007, Barington sent yet another letter to the board expressing disappointment
with the company’s poor operating performance and poor corporate governance. On January
29, 2008, Barington jointly ﬁled a 13D with the Clinton Group and RJG Capital Management,
LLC, asking for a review of executive pay and measures to improve performance and enhance
corporate governance. The dissident group gave formal notice to the company of its intent to
nominate directors for the upcoming election on March 19, 2008. On April 1, 2008, Dillard’s
settled with Barington and other dissidents and nominated two candidates proposed by the
dissident group for election to the board of directors.
Another example is Blockbuster Inc. which was the target of prominent activist Icahn As-
sociates Corp. This event started on April 7, 2005, when Carl Icahn disclosed that he had
4Material in this subsection draws primarily from synopses provided by StreetEvents.
5requested Blockbuster extend the deadline for nominating directors for election at the com-
pany’s 2005 annual meeting. The company rejected the request and on April 8, 2005, Icahn
sent formal notice that he was nominating himself and two others for election to Blockbuster’s
board. In his communications with stockholders, Icahn criticized Blockbuster’s compensation
practices and management’s business plan and stated that if elected his nominees would bring
discipline to the “spending spree.” Icahn also stated that he believed the company should put
itself up for sale. At the annual meeting, Icahn received 63% of the votes cast and his two other
nominees received 68% of the votes cast.
Following these illustrative examples we examine several outcomes in activist director compa-
nies. These include ﬁrm performance outcomes measured using stock returns and accounting
performance; governance outcomes such as CEO turnover and CEO compensation; strategic
outcomes such as divestitures and acquisitions; ﬁnancial policy outcomes such as leverage and
payouts; and investment policy decisions such as capital expenditures, research and develop-
ment, and advertising. While we examine these outcomes in the context of activist directors,
prior papers have examined some of these outcomes in the context of hedge fund activism in
general. We discuss this research next.
2.2. Causes and consequences of hedge fund activism
The phenomenon of shareholder activism that we examine is driven in large part by activist
hedge funds over the last decade. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) identiﬁes structural
beneﬁts enjoyed by hedge funds—such as fewer regulations and better incentives—that have
allowed such funds to be more active in pursuing governance changes in companies than mu-
tual fund or pension managers. Like prior research (Brav et al. 2008), the ultimate source for
much of the data we use to identify activism events comes from 13D ﬁlings with the SEC. Ac-
cording to the SEC, “when a person or group of persons acquires beneﬁcial ownership of more
than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they are required to ﬁle a Schedule 13D with the SEC.”5 This
5https://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm, accessed 2014-05-26.
6ﬁling should be made within 10 days of the trade date of the securities transaction triggering
the requirement to ﬁle. If a shareholder has not “acquired the securities with any purpose, or
with the effect of, changing or inﬂuencing the control of the issuer,” then a more abbreviated
ﬁling on Form 13G may be used.6 As hedge fund activists when launching a campaign look to
change or inﬂuence the target and quite often exceed the 5% threshold, 13D ﬁlings are a typical
concomitant of such campaigns.
In terms of ﬁrm characteristics that attract activist hedge fund attention, prior research suggests
that hedge fund activists typically target smaller ﬁrms, value-oriented ﬁrms (low market-to-
book), and ﬁrms with sound operating cash ﬂows but low sales growth, leverage and dividend
payouts (Brav et al. 2010). This evidence motivates us to use ﬁrm-level covariates to control
for factors causing ﬁrms to be targeted by activist investors. Gantchev (2013) models activism
as involving a sequence of decisions beginning with broad activist demands, followed by de-
mands for board representation, then threatened, then actual, proxy contests. Gantchev (2013)
estimates costs associated with these stages using a system of recursive logistic regressions
and ﬁnds that such costs reduce activist returns by more than two-thirds, but net returns are
not negative. Our paper complements Gantchev (2013) by providing evidence on the kinds of
actions facilitated by escalation of activism to the level of obtaining board representation.
In terms of consequences, prior research (see Brav et al. 2008, Klein and Zur 2009, Greenwood
and Schor 2009) ﬁnds a positive stock price reaction of about ﬁve percent to the announcement
of activist campaigns, typically centered around the 13D announcement dates. Greenwood and
Schor (2009) ﬁnd that the positive market reaction arises from cases where the activists are able
to force the target ﬁrms to be sold following the activist campaign. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
market reaction at the 13D ﬁling date for ﬁrms that are not acquired ex-post. Klein and Zur
(2009) suggests that one source of shareholder gains is the transfer of wealth from debthold-
ers to stockholders. This likely occurs because activists demand reduction in cash holdings
and increase in leverage in target ﬁrms. Brav et al. (2008) and Bebchuk et al. (2013) also ﬁnd
6http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/reg13d-interp.htm, accessed 2014-05-26.
Also see SEC Rule 13d-1(c)(1).
7that operating performance as measured by return on assets is higher in the three to ﬁve year
period following the launch of activism. The mechanisms that drive possible performance im-
provements in ﬁrms that continue to be independent have not been explored much in research
with the exception of Brav et al. (2013). Using plant-level information from the US Census Bu-
reau they ﬁnd that the average target ﬁrm improves production efﬁciency in the three years
after the activist engagement. Employees exhibit increase in labor productivity but a stagna-
tion in wages. In related research, Brav et al. (2014) ﬁnd that targets of hedge fund activism
exhibit reduction in research and development spending but an increase in innovation output
suggesting an improvement in innovation efﬁciency. Our paper complements this research
by identifying a role for activist directors in the changes brought about by activism thereby
identifying a mechanism by which activists carry out the changes they demand.
2.3. Other shareholder activism
While hedge fund activism is a relatively recent phenomenon, a body of prior research has
examined the effect of shareholder activism by pension and labor union funds. Early research
focused on the activities of pension plans, such as CalPERS (Smith 1996) and TIAA-CREF (Car-
leton, Nelson and Weisbach 1998). While pension plans have typically focused on governance
changes generally proposed as part of 14a-8 shareholder proposals, hedge funds often seek to
make more wide-ranging changes to the ﬁrms they target. One conclusion from research on
pension plan activism is that activist shareholders and ﬁrms often reach agreement without a
formal 14a-8 proposal being voted upon—for instance, Carleton et al. (1998) ﬁnds that TIAA-
CREF is able to reach agreements with targeted companies 95 percent of the time and in over 70
percent of cases without a shareholder vote on the proposal. In the UK, Becht, Franks, Mayer
and Rossi (2010) studies a mutual fund (Hermes) and ﬁnd that this fund acts—predominantly
through private interventions. This is consistent with our ﬁnding that activists often obtain
board representation without a formal proxy ﬁght.
82.4. Director elections and proxy ﬁghts
The routine mechanism for someone to become a director is to be nominated for election by
the incumbent board. Unless invited onto the board, the only way for activist shareholders to
obtain board representation is to initiate a proxy solicitation campaign in a contested election.
Contested elections are contests between the incumbent set of directors put forward by the
company and a dissident slate nominated by an outside investor. Dodd and Warner (1983)
provides early evidence consistent with proxy ﬁghts creating value for shareholders. They ﬁnd
a statistically signiﬁcant positive share price effect associated with a proxy contest regardless
of whether the contest was successful or not. However, a number of studies ﬁnd limits to
the effectiveness of proxy contests. While Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) ﬁnd evidence “that
proxy contests create value” using a sample of 270 proxy contests covering 1979–1994, but they
also ﬁnd that “the bulk of the wealth gains stemming from ﬁrms that are acquired.” Pound
(1988) identiﬁes cost and management incumbency as impediments to successful proxy ﬁghts.
More recently, Bebchuk (2007) claims that shareholders’ power to obtain board representation
is largely a “myth” due to free-rider issues associated with investing in costly proxy contents.
While activist directors often join boards as a result of a proxy contest, the majority of activist
directors in our sample join through negotiation with the incumbent board. We contribute to
this debate by providing evidence consistent with an important class of investors being able to
get board representation even absent a contested election.
2.5. Specialist outside directors
Our paper is also related to prior literature that examines the impact of specialist directors, such
as ﬁnancial experts, since activist directors are often associated with hedge funds or are unafﬁl-
iated directors selected for particular expertise. DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) ﬁnds a positive
stock price reaction when directors with accounting expertise are appointed to the audit com-
mittee. G¨ uner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) ﬁnds evidence consistent with bankers inﬂuencing
ﬁnancing and investing decisions, but perhaps in ways that reﬂect conﬂicts of interests. Huang,
9Jiang, Lie and Yang (2014) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with investment bankers on their boards make more
acquisitions and experience higher takeover announcement returns and pay lower premiums
than other ﬁrms.
Overall, this literature shows that directors bring speciﬁc types of expertise to boards and ﬁrms
appear to use this expertise. One difference of our paper from this research stream is that we
examine a class of directors that are not voluntarily invited by the boards that they join. Even in
cases that do not involve a proxy ﬁght, activist directors join boards as a result of a negotiated
outcome between the activist and the incumbent board and management. Given that activist
directors join the board for a speciﬁc activist purpose, their role on the board is likely to be
different from that of other directors.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Activism events
Our data on activism events come from FactSet’s SharkWatch database, which contains infor-
mation on shareholder activism events, primarily in the United States and generally involving
hedge fund activists. From SharkWatch, we collect information on all publicly disclosed ac-
tivismeventsthatcommencedbetweenJanuary1, 2004andDecember31, 2012wherethetarget
ﬁrm is matched to CRSP, is incorporated in the United States, and is not an investment trust
or mutual fund, and where the event is not a control contest involving another corporation.
This provides us with 1,969 activism events. Note that our sample does not include activism
consisting only of shareholder proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8. Table 1 provides details
of the number of activism events over our sample period. We divide the 1,969 activism events
into three mutually exclusive categories: Activist director events in which an activist won board
representation (424 events), Board demand events in which the activist sought, but did not win,
board seats (456 events), and Non-board activism events in which activists targeted the ﬁrm, but
board representation was neither sought nor obtained (1,089 events).
103.2. Activist directors
For each activism event in which SharkWatch indicated that the activist obtained board rep-
resentation, we used proxy statements (DEF 14A) and current ﬁlings (Form 8-K, Item 5.02) to
collect names of the directors who were appointed as a result of the activist campaign. We also
collected appointment dates and basic biographical details. We then examined subsequent SEC
ﬁlings to determine whether and, if so, when the director subsequently left the board during
our sample period. We classiﬁed directors into two categories. The Afﬁliated category com-
prises directors that we identiﬁed as employees or principals of the members of the activist
group, and Unafﬁliated covers the rest. Table 2 provides the yearly distribution of Afﬁliated and
Unafﬁliated directors. Of 824 activist directors appointed as the result of activism campaigns in
our sample, 346 are Afﬁliated and 478 are Unafﬁliated. For illustration, in the Blockbuster case
discussed in Section 2, Carl Icahn is clearly an afﬁliated director, while the other two nominees,
“veteran entertainment industry executives” Edward Bleier and Strauss Zelnick, are unafﬁli-
ated.
3.3. Activist holdings
To identify activist holdings of the stock of targeted ﬁrms, we use data from WhaleWisdom,
which provides comprehensive coverage of SEC Form 13F and 13F/A ﬁlings related to hold-
ings in at quarter-ends from 2001 onward.7 These ﬁlings are required on a quarterly basis
for investors having more than $100 million in assets under management. We ﬁnd that 1,394
(70.87%) of the activism events in our sample are associated with activist that ﬁles on Form
13F.
7See www.whalewisdom.com.
113.4. Director characteristics
Our director-level data come from Equilar.8 The Equilar database comprises directors of every
company that ﬁles both an annual report and an annual proxy statement (SEC Forms 10-K and
DEF 14A, respectively). For each director on a company’s board, Equilar provides director-
level information such as committee memberships, gender, age, equity holding, etc. Panel A of
Table 3 presents director characteristics for each classiﬁcation of directors. While we have data
on 358,193 directors, the more appropriate comparison group for activist directors, for whom
we present data in their ﬁrst year on the board, is their fellow new directors. We identify 28,440
directors as new directors. We identify 678 activist directors (of our full sample of 824) on
Equilar; we ﬁnd that some activist directors leave within a year (e.g., if the ﬁrm is acquired)
and Equilar appears not to capture most such directors, as they often do not appear in the
proxy statement (DEF 14A), which is the primary source for Equilar’s data. Note that these
678 directors represent almost all of the 710 new directors at these ﬁrms, suggesting that we
successfully identify activist directors when they exist.
In general, the unafﬁliated directors are similar to other new directors on most dimensions
except that there is a noticeably smaller number who are female (0.04 versus 0.12). However,
afﬁliateddirectors(i.e., employeesorprincipalsofmembersoftheactivistgroup)appeardiffer-
ent: they are younger (45 years of age), rarely female (0.01) and not often designated ﬁnancial
experts (0.05). While activist directors appear more likely to become members of the compen-
sation committee in their ﬁrst year of service (0.66) versus (0.60 for directors not associated with
activism campaigns), they are less frequently added to the audit committee (0.29), especially
afﬁliated directors (0.24), than non-activism directors (0.33), or designated as “audit committee
ﬁnancial experts” (0.07 for activist directors versus 0.14 for non-activism directors).9
Panel B of Table 3 presents some data on the tenure of our activist directors. About 35% of
both afﬁliated and unafﬁliated activist directors remain on their respective boards at the time
8Equilar is an executive compensation and corporate governance data ﬁrm.
9SEC rules require a company to disclose whether it has at least one “audit committee ﬁnancial expert” serving
on its audit committee, and if so, the name of the expert and whether the expert is independent of management.
See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm.
12of our data collection (December 2013). Afﬁliated (unafﬁliated) directors who have left their
respective boards, did so after being on the board for 695 (752) days on average (i.e., they
remained on the board for about two years). In many cases, their departure was associated
with the company being acquired, going private, or going bankrupt. Afﬁliated and unafﬁliated
activist directors who are still on their respective boards in December 2013 have an average
tenure of nearly four years. There is no apparent difference between afﬁliated and unafﬁliated
directors in these tenure statistics.
3.5. Other data
Data on divestitures and acquisitions as used in Table 8 come from Capital IQ and CRSP. In
Tables 4 and 8–11, we use a number of controls drawn from several sources. We calculate
Analyst, the number of analyst forecasts for each ﬁrm-year using data from IBES. We derive
the proportion of the ﬁrm’s outstanding stock held by institutions (Institutional) using data
from WhaleWisdom. Data on stock market performance come from CRSP and Ken French’s
website. The following variables come from Compustat: Market value, the value of market cap-
italization; Book-to-market, market capitalization divided by the book value of common equity;
Leverage, sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by sum of long-term debt, cur-
rent liabilities and the book value of common equity; Payout, the ratio of the sum of dividends
and repurchases divided to EBITDA); ROA, EBITDA divided by the lagged total assets; Sales
growth, Sales divided by lagged sales. From Equilar, we get the following variables: Num. direc-
tors, the number of directors on the board; Outside percent, the percentage of outside directors;
Age, the average age of directors on the board; Tenure, the average years of directorship on the
board; and, Staggered board, an indicator for a classiﬁed board.
4. Activist target selection
Prior research suggests that hedge fund activists typically target smaller ﬁrms, value-oriented
ﬁrms (low market-to-book), and ﬁrms with sound operating cash ﬂows but low sales growth,
13leverage and dividend payouts (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010). We extend this analysis to our
sample and additionally examine whether the factors that are associated with activists seeking,
or getting, board representation differ from those associated with activism in general.
We ﬁrst examine the circumstances in which ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves as the targets of activists.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variables
are indicators for activism and the sample is the universe of ﬁrm-years meeting our sample
requirements for the years 2004 to 2012. The ﬁrst column looks at the probability of being
targeted for any kind of activism event, the second column examines the determinants of an
activist making demands for board representation, and the third column examines the deter-
minants of an activist getting representation on a ﬁrm’s board.10 Consistent with prior research
(Brav et al. 2008), we ﬁnd that size-adjusted returns and growth are negatively associated with
being targeted by activists, consistent with activists targeting poorly performing ﬁrms. Also,
consistent with prior research, we ﬁnd that smaller companies are more likely to be targeted.
We also ﬁnd in all speciﬁcations that activists are more likely to target ﬁrms with more direc-
tors, consistent with the number of directors being a proxy for poor governance and activists
targeting ﬁrms with worse governance (Yermack 1996). However, the signiﬁcantly positive co-
efﬁcient on Outside percent is difﬁcult to explain in the same way, as this measure is suggested
by some to be a proxy for good governance (Bhagat and Bolton 2008). We also see evidence that
activists are more likely to target ﬁrms with greater portion of their shares held by institutional
investors, consistent with these investors being more open to supporting activists.
In Panel B of Table 4, we focus on activism events in examining two questions. First, given
that a ﬁrm has been targeted by activists, what are the factors that are associated with the ac-
tivist demanding board seats? Second, given that an activist has demanded board seats, what
factors are associated with the activist’s demands being met? We ﬁnd evidence that condi-
tional on selecting a ﬁrm as a target, an activist is more likely to demand board representation
when the ﬁrm is smaller, and when leverage is lower. Again activists are more likely to de-
10Note that, in contrast to our other analyses, for the purpose of this table, our activism indicators are not
mutually exclusive. That is, Activism
⇤ includes cases in any of the categories Activism, Board demand, and Activist
director. Board demand includes cases of Activist director as well as cases where the board demands are not succesful
14mand board representation at ﬁrms with more directors, consistent with activists being more
inclined to seek board representation when targeting ﬁrms with worse governance (Yermack
1996). We also see evidence that activists are more likely both to seek and to get board represen-
tation when targeting ﬁrms with greater portion of their shares held by institutional investors,
consistent with these investors being more open to supporting activist candidates. We see
no evidence of staggered boards preventing activists from getting board representation (coef.
 0.173, p>0.1), suggesting that the effect observed in column (3) of Panel A may arise due
to deterrence of activism entirely. There is little or no relation between prior poor performance
and seeking or obtaining board representation. This may be a measurement timing issue, as
the Barington/Dillard’s example discussed in Section 2 suggests that poor performance after
the commencement of the activism campaign may be more relevant for determining whether
an activist seeks or obtains board representation conditional on targeting a ﬁrm; our covariates
relate to pre-activism measures of performance.
5. Activist holding periods
We next examine whether the category of activism is associated with the length of time the
activist holds the stock. We use 13F ﬁling data to determine when an activist acquires and dis-
poses of stock. Because 13F ﬁlings are quarterly, our measures of holding period (expressed
in days) have some measurement error. We examine three holding periods: Entry–Exit, which
runs from the ﬁrst date on which the stock was held to the last date the stock was held; Annc–
Exit, which runs from the date on which activism was ﬁrst announced (typically with a 13D ﬁl-
ing) to exit; and Appt–exit, which runs from the ﬁrst appointment of an activist director through
to the date of exit.11
One issue with measuring holding periods is that censoring is signiﬁcant in our sample. This
occurs because many of the activism campaigns in our sample are recent and the activist con-
tinues to hold stock at the time we measure the holding period. Thus to estimate the association
11We measure the exit date as the record date of the ﬁrst 13F ﬁling in which the stock is no longer part of the
activist’s portfolio.
15between activism category and holding period, we use censored median regression (Portnoy
2003). Table 5 presents these results. We ﬁnd that, relative to Activism without board demands,
Board demand events have holding periods that are one quarter shorter, though statistical sig-
niﬁcance is weak. Turning to Activist director cases, we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant incremental
holding period of 236 days from entry to exit and 352 days from announcement of activism to
exit.12 While the estimated median holding period for Activism events is 860 days (i.e., about
2.4 years), the equivalent for Activist director events is 1,095 days (i.e., about 3 years). From
announcement to exit, Activist director activists hold the stock for 798 days (2.2 years) and for
601 days (1.6 years) from ﬁrst appointment of an activist director.
To put these statistics into perspective, it is helpful to consider some benchmarks. Cremers
et al. (2013) examine the holding period of various kinds of investors. They examine four
categories of investors (banks, pension funds, investment companies, and others) and ﬁnd that
pension funds have the longest duration at 2 years. They also examine the holdings of some
institutional investors and provide only one example of an investor with a duration greater
than three years, namely the well-known long-term investor, Berkshire Hathaway, which had
a duration of between 3 and 4 years during our sample period. Another reference point is
provided by the Beyer et al. (2014) survey of investor relation professionals, who consider
2.8 years as a cutoff beyond which investors can be considered “long-term” investors. These
benchmarks suggest the three-year holding period of activists getting representation on boards
provides them with a relatively long investment horizon.
6. Stock returns
We follow prior research in examining the impact of activism on stock returns, but examine
whether stock market reactions to activism differ by the three categories of activism: Activism,
Board demand, and Activist director.
We begin by looking at short-window returns around the announcement of activism. Because
12This is consistent with Activist director having a shorter period from entry to announcement of activism.
16prior research has documented a run-up in the 10 days prior to the public announcement of
activism and some drift thereafter, we follow Brav et al. (2008) in using a window beginning 20
days before and ending 20 days after the announcement of activism. For short-window tests,
we consider raw, market-adjusted, and size-adjusted returns (R, RMKT, and RSZ, respectively).
Results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. Consistent with prior research, (Brav et al. 2008),
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant announcement-period returns for activism events, with market-adjusted re-
turns ranging from 3.9% to 4.9% for the three categories, and with no statistically signiﬁcant
differences across the categories.13 We get very similar results when we consider returns win-
dows such as ( 10,+10) and ( 1,+1) days.
In Panel B of Table 6, we examine the market reaction around the appointment of activist di-
rector. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant market reaction around this date, perhaps due to the
difﬁculty in measuring exactly when the market learned about the appointment in many cases.
Because we did not ﬁnd any reaction around this date, we partition Activism director cases into
large and small investments using a cut-off of $100 million, denoted Invest < $100m and Invest
> $100m, respectively. This allows for the possibility that the market may react more to ac-
tivism when the activist’s stake is higher. However, the results in Panel B suggest no reaction
in either partition.
In Panels C and D of Table 6, we examine returns over the 12-month and 36-month periods
from the announcement of activism. Due to the greater importance of controlling for risk over
longer periods, we also consider Fama-French abnormal returns, using both equal-weighted
and value-weighted returns for the associated benchmark portfolios. While we see some large,
statistically signiﬁcant returns in raw returns for three of the four categories, these generally
disappear once risk is taken into account. There is relatively weak evidence of positive returns
(at the10%level fromt tot+12months) foractivism notinvolving activist directors, but returns
for both activist director categories are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
One issue with interpreting the returns for the activist director cases is that the director ap-
13Note that at the time of the announcement of activism, the market would not know which category the ac-
tivism would ultimately fall into.
17pointments generally occur well after the announcement of activism events. Thus we consider
longer-window returns for activist director cases beginning from the appointment of these di-
rectors to the board. Results are reported in Panels E (12-month returns) and F (36-month
returns) of Table 6. While we do not ﬁnd positive risk-adjusted returns over either period
for smaller investments (i.e., Invest < $100m), we do ﬁnd evidence over the longer period for
larger investments (i.e., Invest > $100m): estimated excess returns relative to a Fama-French
value-weighted portfolio are 25.1% over the three-year window (p<0.05).
7. Firm outcomes
While stock market reaction provides a useful measure for evaluating the impact of activists,
it is not without issues. First, we need to identify the time at which the market learned about
the prospect of activist involvement. Second, we need the market to estimate the impact of
activism in an unbiased manner and impound this estimate into price promptly. Finally, even
if these difﬁculties are addressed, the stock market reaction does not provide insight into how
activists affect corporate policy and ﬁrm value.
In this section, we examine the impact of activists, especially activist directors, on a number of
outcomes, with a focus on outcomes that are commonly sought by activists.
7.1. Proﬁtability
We ﬁrst examine the association between activism and operating performance. Our empirical
approach follows that of Bebchuk et al. (2013), which is a modiﬁcation of the approach used
in Brav et al. (2008). Thus we measure operating performance as return on assets calculated
as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item oibdp) di-
vided by lagged total assets (at). For each ﬁrm-year t, we construct indicators for activism in
year t+s where s 2 { 3,...,+5}, where, for example, Activistt 3 takes the value 1 for t =2 0 0 4
and a given ﬁrm if an activism campaign began in 2007.
18We estimate three models. Following Bebchuk et al. (2013), all models include year ﬁxed ef-
fects, market value, and ﬁrm age, and indicators for activism. Following, Bebchuk et al. (2013),
models (A) and (B) add industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, respectively. To examine a possible
incremental effect of an activist getting board representation, Model (C) reﬁnes model (B) by
including indicators for activist director appointments in years ranging from three years prior
(Activist directort 3) to ﬁve years subsequent (Activist directort+5).
Table 7 presents results. The quantities presented in the table represent estimates of the impact
of activism and activist directors, and are calculated as the difference between the estimated
coefﬁcients on the respective activism indicators for years t + s and t, where s 2 {1,...,5}.
With model (A), we ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in ROA for years t+3through t+5. Once we add
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, i.e., in models (B) and (C), we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant increases in ROA
in all ﬁve years. These effects are economically signiﬁcant, with the ﬁve-year increase in ROA
exceeding 2% in both models.
Looking at the incremental effect of getting an activist candidate on the board, we do not de-
tect a statistically signiﬁcant effect. While the incremental effects are positive in all years, they
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. If an incremental effect does exist, our failure to
detect it statistically may be attributed to a lack of power stemming from a small number of
observations (e.g., we have just 34 observations with Activist directort+5 equal to one) and mul-
ticollinearity between our activism indicators (in many cases, the activist director is appointed
in the same year that the activist campaign commences).
Having demonstrated an effect of activism on operating performance, we next turn to a range
of other outcomes that activists often seek to inﬂuence more directly. The examples discussed
above in Section 2 suggest that activists often seek to inﬂuence corporate policy or decisions
on a wide range of matters. The include matters related to mergers and acquisitions (including
divestitures of businesses), CEO turnover and compensation, capital structure (including cash
holdings and dividend payout), and investment policy.
197.2. Divestiture and acquisitions
The ﬁrst set of outcomes we examine relate to mergers and acquisitions. The examples dis-
cussed above suggest that one concern activists have is with excessive spending on acquisitions
by target ﬁrms. Thus, the ﬁrst outcome we consider is Acquisition, an indicator for whether the
ﬁrm completed any acquisitions in the three years a given ﬁscal year. Greenwood and Schor
(2009, 362) suggest that announcement returns associated with activism “are largely explained
by the ability of activists to force target ﬁrms into a takeover.” Thus one outcome we consider,
Acquired, is an indicator for whether the ﬁrm was acquired in the three years after a given ﬁscal
year. Finally, often activists urge ﬁrms to divest businesses. Thus our third outcome is Divesti-
ture, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm divested signiﬁcant assets in the three years after a given
ﬁscal year. We regress these indicators on industry and year dummies as well as the following
controls (as described in Section 3), Analyst, Institutional, Market value, Book-to-market, Leverage,
Payout, ROA, Sales growth, Outside percent, Age, Tenure, and Staggered board.
Table 8 presents these results. Examining the ﬁrst column in Table 8, we see all three categories
of activism are associated with signiﬁcantly lower probability of acquisitions (coefs  0.081 to
 0.116, p<0.01). On the other hand, activism is positively associated with being acquired
(coefs 0.044 to 0.150), but the association is strongest when activism is in the category Non-board
activism and lower when an activist director is appointed (the difference between Non-board
activism and the other two forms of activism is statistically signiﬁcant). Finally, divestitures are
only associated with activism of the form Activist director (coef. 0.058, p<0.05).
7.3. CEO turnover and compensation
We next consider the association of activism with CEO turnover and compensation. We con-
jecture that activists may seek CEO turnover and may also seek to alter the level or structure of
CEO compensation. While it seems plausible that activists would see to decrease CEO compen-
sation, it is unclear whether they would reduce the percentage of compensation that is variable
or increase it to enhance performance sensitivity.
20We code the indicator CEO turnover equal to 1 if the CEO at the end of year t is no longer the
CEO (but the company still exists) in year t +3 . For total CEO pay, we regress total CEO com-
pensation in year t +3on controls, including CEO compensation in year t, and indicators for
each category of activism. To assess change in performance-based compensation, we regress
the proportion of CEO compensation that is variable (i.e., not salary) on its lagged value, con-
trols, and activism indicators. We regress these variables on their lagged (year t) values, in-
dustry and year dummies as well as the following controls (as described in Section 3), Analyst,
Institutional, Market value, Book-to-market, Leverage, Payout, ROA, Sales growth, Outside percent,
Age, Tenure, and Staggered board.
Results of our analysis are presented in Table 9. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant association
between Non-board activism and CEO turnover. We ﬁnd positive associations between CEO
turnover and both Board demand (coef. 0.089, p<0.05) and Activist director (coef. 0.153, p<
0.01). We ﬁnd that CEO compensation is negatively associations between CEO compensation
and both Non-board activism (coef.  0.098, p<0.01) and Activist director (coef.  0.132, p<0.01).
Finally, we see some evidence of reduction in the proportion of compensation that is non-salary
associated with Non-board activism, but not with the other two categories of activism. These
results collectively point to a changing pattern of CEO incentives in the presence of activist
directors.
7.4. Capital structure and payouts
Among the most common demands activists make are requests for ﬁrms to increase the pay-
ment of dividends, reduce cash holdings, and to increase leverage. In Table 10, we examine the
association between activism and measures of cash holding, leverage, and shareholder pay-
out (dividends and share repurchases). We ﬁnd that only Activist director is associated with
reduced cash holdings (coef.  0.029, p<0.05). We ﬁnd that leverage is associated with both
Non-board activism (coef. 0.018, p<0.01) and Activist director (coef. 0.021, p<0.05). Finally, only
Activist director (coef. 0.112, p<0.05) is associated with increased payout. Overall, the evidence
21in Table 10 points to activist directors being associated with the kinds of capital structure and
payout changes demands frequently demanded by activists.
As outcome variables we consider Cash, calculated as the ratio of total cash and short-term
investments to the book value of total assets; Leverage, measured as the ratio of book value of
debt to the sum of the book value of debt and equity; and, Payout, measured as the ratio of total
dividends and share repurchases to EBITDA for the three years after year t. We regress these
variables on their year-t values, industry and year dummies as well as the following controls
(as described in Section 3), Analyst, Institutional, Market value, Book-to-market, Leverage, Payout,
ROA, Sales growth, Outside percent, Age, Tenure, and Staggered board.
7.5. Investment
Finally, we examine the association between activism and three areas of spending commonly
regarded as investment: capital expenditures, research and development (R&D), and adver-
tising. We measure investment using the following proxies: CapEx, measured as the ratio of
capital expenditure for three years after announcement of activism to the lagged book value
of total assets; R&D, measured as the ratio of total R&D expenditure for three years after an-
nouncement of activism to the lagged book value of total assets; and, Advertising, measured
as the ratio of advertising expenditure for three years after announcement of activism to the
lagged book value of total assets. We regress these variables on their year-t values, industry
and year dummies as well as the following controls (as described in Section 3), Analyst, Insti-
tutional, Market value, Book-to-market, Leverage, Payout, ROA, Sales growth, Outside percent, Age,
Tenure, and Staggered board.
Results are presented in Table 11. We ﬁnd negative associations between all three categories of
activism and capital expenditure, the coefﬁcient on Activist director (coef.  0.054, p<0.01) is
signiﬁcantly more negative than that on Non-board activism (coef.  0.020, p<0.01). Only with
Activist director do we see a negative associations with R&D spending (coef.  0.024, p<0.01)
and advertising (coef.  0.005, p<0.01).
22Overall, the evidence in Table 11 is consistent with activist directors playing a signiﬁcant role in
curbing expenditures on capital, research and development (R&D), and advertising. However,
it is unclear whether this reﬂects curtailment of excessive investments or, as critics of activists
might suggest, underinvestment and a focus on the short term.
8. Conclusion
In recent years, the phenomenon of hedge fund managers attempting to actively intervene in
the governance of ﬁrms they invest in has gained prominence. These fund managers often lay-
out an investment thesis regarding their target ﬁrms and vigorously engage with their targets
to realize their thesis. Instead of passively waiting for an investment hypothesis to validate
itself (like most institutional fund managers do), activist hedge fund managers often demand
seats on the board of their targets as a mechanism to effect change in investee ﬁrms and thereby
actively control the outcome of their investment. While attaining directorship might not be the
end goal, it is perhaps the stick that activists use to force companies to take their demands
seriously. Given the importance that the demand for board positions has in the activist game
plan, we examine hedge fund activism thorough the lens of activist directors, i.e., cases where
candidates sponsored by the activists become directors of the target companies.
We ﬁnd that activists are more likely to gain board seats at smaller ﬁrms and those with weaker
stockpriceperformance. Asinpriorresearch, weﬁndpositiveannouncement-periodreturnsof
around 4–5% when a ﬁrm is targeted by activists, including in cases where the activists ex-post
gain board seats, and a 2% increase in return on assets over the subsequent one to ﬁve years.
When they have board seats, activists remain as shareholders long enough to be considered
long-term investors by conventional standards, with holding periods averaging three years.
The long-term shareholding combined with positive stock-price and operating performance
effects suggests that the short-termism concern often expressed in the context of hedge fund
activists may be less apparent in cases when activists become directors.
Activist directors appear to be associated with signiﬁcant strategic and operational changes in
23target ﬁrms. We ﬁnd evidence of increased divestiture, decreased acquisition activity, higher
probability of being acquired, lower cash balances, higher payout, greater leverage, higher
CEO turnover, lower CEO compensation, and reduced investment. With the exception of the
probability of being acquired, the estimated effects are generally greater when activists obtain
board representation, consistent with board representation being an important mechanism for
bringing about the kinds of changes that activists often demand.
Our results do not allow us to conclude that these actions themselves are value-enhancing
even if they are concomitant with better operating performance and stock returns. Moreover,
the data available to us do not permit causal inferences. Despite these limitations, the range of
associationsthatwedocumentsuggestthatgainingboardpositionsisanimportantmechanism
that allows hedge fund activists to have an impact in ways that line up with the demands that
they make of companies.
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30Table 4: Activist target selection
All regressions in this table include the following controls measured for the prior ﬁscal year-end: An-
alyst, the number of analyst forecasts for each ﬁrm-year (I/B/E/S); Institutional, the proportion of the
ﬁrms outstanding stock held by institutions; Size-adj. ret, twelve-month size-adjusted returns calculated
as raw return over a year minus return for the size-matched decile provided by CRSP; Market value, the
value of market capitalization; Book-to-market, market capitalization divided by the book value of com-
mon equity; Leverage, sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by sum of long-term debt,
current liabilities and the book value of common equity; Payout the ratio of the sum of dividends and
repurchases divided to EBITDA); ROA, EBITDA divided by the lagged total assets; Sales growth, Sales
divided by lagged sales; Num. directors, the number of directors on the board; Outside percent, the per-
centage of outside directors; Age, the average age of directors on the board; Tenure, the average years of
directorship on the board; Staggered board, indicator for staggered board. All controls are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% levels. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. *** (**, *) indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
31Table 4: Activist target selection
Panel A presents logit regression where the dependent variables are indicators for being targeted for
activism in any category (Non-board activism, Board demand, or Activist director, column 1), being the
target of an activist demanding or getting board seats (Board demand or Activist director, Column 2) and
activists getting board seats (Activist director, Column 3). Sample includes ﬁrm-years with and without
activism.
Panel A: Activism, board demands and activist directors
Dependent variable:
Activism Board demand Activist director
(1) (2) (3)
Analyst 0.006  0.003  0.008
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Inst 1.640⇤⇤⇤ 1.877⇤⇤⇤ 2.051⇤⇤⇤
(0.082) (0.111) (0.139)
Size-adj. ret  0.296⇤⇤⇤  0.419⇤⇤⇤  0.462⇤⇤⇤
(0.059) (0.083) (0.134)
Market value  0.664⇤⇤⇤  0.912⇤⇤⇤  0.903⇤⇤⇤
(0.064) (0.074) (0.100)
Book-to-market  0.003  0.060  0.028
(0.049) (0.054) (0.068)
Leverage 0.060  0.278⇤⇤  0.629⇤⇤⇤
(0.117) (0.138) (0.181)
Payout  0.098  0.232  0.406
(0.159) (0.196) (0.299)
ROA 0.097 0.261 0.474⇤⇤
(0.133) (0.165) (0.237)
Sales growth  0.175⇤  0.237⇤⇤  0.255⇤
(0.094) (0.097) (0.133)
Num. directors 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.135⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016)
Outside percent 1.057⇤⇤⇤ 1.589⇤⇤⇤ 1.511⇤⇤⇤
(0.254) (0.306) (0.334)
Age 0.024⇤⇤⇤ 0.028⇤⇤⇤ 0.021⇤
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Tenure  0.042⇤⇤⇤  0.056⇤⇤⇤  0.069⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Staggered board  0.106⇤  0.105  0.251⇤⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.073) (0.092)
Constant  3.620⇤⇤⇤  4.254⇤⇤⇤  4.722⇤⇤⇤
(0.431) (0.520) (0.655)
Pseudo-R2 0.298 0.308 0.288
Observations 35,981 35,153 35,153
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
32Table 4: Activist target selection
Panel B presents logit regression where the dependent variables are indicators for activist demanding
or getting board seats (Board demand or Activist director, Column 1) and activists getting board seats
(Activist director, Column 2) conditional on the ﬁrm being targeted by activists.
Panel B: Activism, board demand and activist director (activism only)
Dependent variable:
Board demand Activist director
(1) (2)
Analyst  0.002  0.006
(0.013) (0.015)
Inst 0.501⇤⇤ 0.733⇤⇤⇤
(0.220) (0.260)
Size-adj. ret  0.160⇤  0.131
(0.084) (0.107)
Market value  0.507⇤⇤⇤  0.423⇤⇤⇤
(0.124) (0.137)
Book-to-market  0.034 0.011
(0.085) (0.095)
Leverage  0.409⇤⇤  0.649⇤⇤⇤
(0.165) (0.195)
Payout  0.215  0.336
(0.304) (0.347)
ROA 0.245 0.510
(0.382) (0.414)
Sales growth  0.126  0.098
(0.112) (0.148)
Num. directors 0.108⇤⇤⇤ 0.123⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.024)
Outside percent 1.393⇤⇤ 0.735
(0.682) (0.601)
Age 0.010  0.001
(0.013) (0.015)
Tenure  0.021  0.029
(0.016) (0.018)
Staggered board  0.023  0.173
(0.106) (0.114)
Constant  0.299  1.057
(0.756) (0.810)
Sample Activism Activism
Pseudo-R2 0.778 0.688
Observations 1,504 1,504
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
33Table 5: Activist holding periods
Table presents results of censored median regression analysis of holding period (days) on
activism category. Entry–exit refers to the time (in days) between the record date of the ﬁrst
ﬁling by the activist where the target stock is listed in the activist’s portfolio through to the
record date of the ﬁrst ﬁling where it is not (exit date) Annc–exit refers to the time between
announcement of activism and the exit date. Appt–exit refers to the time between the ﬁrst
activist director appointment and the exit date.
Regression coefﬁcients
Entry–exit Annc–exit
Intercept 859.721⇤⇤⇤ 446.120⇤⇤⇤
(2.753) (16.282)
Board demand  91.592 1.224
(193.231) (43.946)
Activist director 235.687⇤⇤⇤ 352.040⇤⇤⇤
(56.649) (57.296)
Implied median holding periods (days)
Entry–exit Annc–exit Appt–exit
Non-board activism 860 446
Board demand 768 447
Activist director 1095 798 601
34Table 6: Stock returns
Table presents returns by category of activism where R, RMKT, RSZ denote raw,
market-adjusted, and size-adjusted returns respectively.
Panel A: Days  20 to +20 around announcement of activism.
Dependent variable:
RR MKT RSZ
(1) (2) (3)
Non-board activism 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Board demand 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Activist director 0.047⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 1,892 1,892 1,890
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Panel B: Days  1 to +1 around appointment.
Dependent variable:
RR MKT RSZ
(1) (2) (3)
Invest. > $100m 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Invest. < $100m 0.008⇤ 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 401 401 401
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
35Table 6: Stock returns
Table presents returns by category of activism where R, RMKT, RSZ denote raw,
market-adjusted, and size-adjusted returns respectively. RFFV (RFFE) denotes
value-weighted (equal-weighted) Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns.
Panel C: From activism announcement (month t) to month t +1 2 .
Dependent variable:
RR MKT RSZ RFFV RFFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-board activism 0.127⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤ 0.051⇤⇤ 0.029 0.023
(0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
Board demand 0.874⇤⇤ 0.759⇤ 0.703⇤ 0.114⇤⇤ 0.108⇤⇤
(0.426) (0.424) (0.420) (0.052) (0.052)
Activist director 0.110⇤⇤ 0.021  0.004  0.007  0.014
(0.043) (0.036) (0.039) (0.031) (0.030)
Observations 1,925 1,925 1,916 1,809 1,809
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
36Table 6: Stock returns
Table presents returns by category of activism where R, RMKT, RSZ denote raw,
market-adjusted, and size-adjusted returns respectively. RFFV (RFFE) denotes
value-weighted (equal-weighted) Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns.
Panel D: From activism announcement (month t) to month t +3 6 .
Dependent variable:
RR MKT RSZ RFFV RFFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-board activism 0.676⇤⇤ 0.518⇤⇤ 0.459⇤ 0.010  0.009
(0.267) (0.259) (0.258) (0.032) (0.032)
Board demand 1.352⇤⇤ 1.150⇤⇤ 1.001⇤⇤ 0.064 0.048
(0.528) (0.515) (0.509) (0.062) (0.062)
Activist director 0.241⇤⇤ 0.098 0.001  0.031  0.051
(0.096) (0.088) (0.084) (0.056) (0.055)
Observations 1,657 1,657 1,649 1,586 1,586
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Panel E: From activist appointment date (month t) to month t +1 2 .
Dependent variable:
RR MKT RSZ RFFV RFFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invest. > $100m 0.224⇤⇤⇤ 0.121⇤⇤ 0.089⇤ 0.045 0.035
(0.074) (0.057) (0.054) (0.050) (0.048)
Invest. < $100m 0.079⇤  0.005  0.048  0.007  0.015
(0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Observations 411 411 410 397 397
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
37Table 6: Stock returns
Table presents returns by category of activism where R, RMKT, RSZ denote raw,
market-adjusted, and size-adjusted returns respectively. RFFV (RFFE) denotes
value-weighted (equal-weighted) Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns.
Panel F: From activist appointment date (month t) to month t +3 6 .
Dependent variable:
RR MKT RSZ RFFV RFFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Invest. > $100m 0.497⇤⇤⇤ 0.320⇤⇤⇤ 0.225⇤ 0.251⇤⇤ 0.219⇤
(0.138) (0.117) (0.116) (0.120) (0.121)
Invest. < $100m 0.326⇤⇤⇤ 0.127 0.043 0.082 0.060
(0.114) (0.109) (0.108) (0.101) (0.100)
Observations 321 321 320 315 315
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
38Table 7: Operating performance
Table presents estimates of the impact of activism on return on assets over 5 years after the announce-
ment of activism. The empirical approach follows that of Bebchuk et al. (2013). We regress return on
assets on indicators for activism events in any of the three categories, including Board demand and
Activist director, ranging from three years prior (Activismt 3) to ﬁve years subsequent (Activismt+5). We
estimate three models. Following Bebchuk et al. (2013), all models include year ﬁxed effects, market
value, and ﬁrm age, and indicators for activism. Models (A) and (B) add industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects, respectively. Model (C) also adds ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, as well as indicators for activist director
appointments in years ranging from three years prior (Activist directort 3) to ﬁve years subsequent
(Activist directort+5). The quantities presented in the table represent estimates of the impact of activism
and activist directors, and are calculated as the difference between the estimated coefﬁcients on the
respective activism indicators for years t + s and t, where s 2 {1,...,5}. Numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** (**, *) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Activism Activism Activism Activist director
ROAt+1   ROAt 0.006 0.009⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤ 0.003
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
ROAt+2   ROAt 0.009 0.011⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤ 0.004
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013)
ROAt+3   ROAt 0.012⇤ 0.015⇤⇤⇤ 0.014⇤⇤ 0.011
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
ROAt+4   ROAt 0.015⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014)
ROAt+5   ROAt 0.020⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Model: (A) (B) (C) (C)
Fixed effects: Industry, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year
Number of observations with activism indicator equal to 1
Activism Activist director
Yeart 3 920 172
Yeart 2 968 177
Yeart 1 999 179
Yeart 1016 183
Yeart+1 841 136
Yeart+2 673 104
Yeart+3 547 82
Yeart+4 420 48
Yeart+5 268 34
39Table 8: Divestitures and acquisitions
Table presents regressions of outcome variables on ﬁrm-year level activism indicators. Acquisition indi-
cates the ﬁrm completed acquisitions within three years after year t. Acquired indicates delisting within
three years of year t with CRSP delisting code dlstcd 2 [200,399]. Divestiture indicates the ﬁrm com-
pleted divestitures and spinoffs within three years of year t. Regressions include industry and year
ﬁxed effects and the following controls (Control variables are measured for the ﬁscal year-end of year t):
Total assets, book value of total assets; Analyst, number of analyst forecasts for each ﬁrm-year (I/B/E/S);
Institutional, proportion of the ﬁrm’s outstanding stock held by institutions; Size-adj. ret, twelve-month
size-adjusted returns; Market value, the value of market capitalization; Book-to-market, market capitaliza-
tion divided by the book value of common equity; Leverage, ratio of debt to debt plus book value of
common equity; Payout the ratio of the sum of dividends and repurchases divided to EBITDA; ROA,
EBITDA divided by the lagged total assets; Sales growth, sales divided by lagged sales; Num. directors,
the number of directors on the board; Outside percent, the percentage of outside directors; Age, the av-
erage age of directors; Tenure, the average tenure of directors; Staggered board, indicator for staggered
board. All controls and CEO comp are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Values in parentheses are
standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. *** (**, *) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependent variable:
Acquisition Acquired Divestiture
(1) (2) (3)
Non-board activism  0.084⇤⇤⇤ 0.150⇤⇤⇤ 0.024
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Board demand  0.081⇤⇤⇤ 0.081⇤⇤⇤ 0.047
(0.029) (0.027) (0.030)
Activist director  0.116⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant  0.066 0.255⇤⇤⇤  0.229⇤⇤
(0.086) (0.052) (0.100)
F-tests for equal coefﬁcients (p-values)
Board demand = Activist director 0.310 0.261 0.745
Non-board activism = Activist director 0.202 0.000 0.195
Non-board activism = Board demand 0.937 0.018 0.493
Observations 86,882 86,235 86,882
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.045 0.135
40Table 9: CEO turnover and compensation
Table presents regressions of variables on ﬁrm-year level activism categorical variables. CEO exit in-
dicates a change in CEO between the end of year t and the end of year t +3 . CEO compt+3 is log of
total CEO compensation in year t +3Perf comp is the percentage of CEO compensation that not salary.
Controls are as described in Table 8. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. *** (**,
*) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependent variable:
CEO exit(t+1,t+3) CEO compt+3 Perf compt+3
(1) (2) (3)
Non-board activism 0.023  0.098⇤⇤⇤  0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.029) (0.023)
Board demand 0.089⇤⇤  0.017 0.009
(0.042) (0.053) (0.024)
Activist director 0.153⇤⇤⇤  0.132⇤⇤⇤  0.029
(0.038) (0.047) (0.018)
Dep. var.t  0.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.426⇤⇤⇤ 0.076⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.029)
Constant 0.105 6.557⇤⇤⇤  0.108
(0.091) (0.189) (0.161)
F-tests for equal coefﬁcients (p-values)
Board demand = Activist director 0.212 0.087 0.136
Non-board activism = Activist director 0.001 0.499 0.210
Non-board activism = Board demand 0.146 0.158 0.026
Observations 39,762 49,757 49,779
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.717 0.021
41Table 10: Capital structure
Cash is calculated as the ratio of total cash and short-term investments to the book value of total assets.
Leverage is measured as the ratio of book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and equity.
Payout is measured as the ratio of total dividends and share repurchases to EBITDA for the three years
after year t. Controls are as described in Table 8. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by
ﬁrm. *** (**, *) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependent variable:
Cash Leverage Payout
(1) (2) (3)
Non-board activism  0.008 0.018⇤⇤⇤  0.052
(0.008) (0.007) (0.061)
Board demand  0.015  0.002 0.050
(0.015) (0.007) (0.064)
Activist director  0.029⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤ 0.112⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.010) (0.056)
Dep. var.t 0.876⇤⇤⇤ 0.882⇤⇤⇤ 0.328⇤⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.007) (0.015)
Constant 0.025 0.012 0.120⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.012) (0.053)
F-tests for equal coefﬁcients (p-values)
Board demand = Activist director 0.466 0.060 0.412
Non-board activism = Activist director 0.112 0.773 0.040
Non-board activism = Board demand 0.688 0.034 0.223
Observations 62,226 62,262 59,475
Adjusted R2 0.517 0.858 0.236
42Table 11: Investment
Table presents regressions of variables on ﬁrm-year level activism categorical variables. CapEx is mea-
sured as the ratio of capital expenditure for three years after announcement of activism to the lagged
book value of total assets. R&D is measured as the ratio of total R&D expenditure for three years after
announcement of activism to the lagged book value of total assets. Advertising is measured as the ratio
of advertising expenditure for three years after announcement of activism to the lagged book value of
total assets. Controls are as described in Table 8. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by
ﬁrm. *** (**, *) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependent variable:
CapEx R&D Advertising
(1) (2) (3)
Non-board activism  0.020⇤⇤⇤  0.003  0.002
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Board demand  0.028⇤⇤⇤ 0.001  0.003⇤
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002)
Activist director  0.054⇤⇤⇤  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.007) (0.001)
Dep. var.t 2.336⇤⇤⇤ 3.273⇤⇤⇤ 3.105⇤⇤⇤
(0.060) (0.053) (0.036)
Constant 0.087⇤⇤⇤ 0.006 0.003
(0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
F-tests for equal coefﬁcients (p-values)
Board demand = Activist director 0.040 0.007 0.268
Non-board activism = Activist director 0.004 0.001 0.124
Non-board activism = Board demand 0.458 0.607 0.689
Observations 62,387 62,387 62,387
Adjusted R2 0.680 0.840 0.867
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